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Abstract
Since 1988, 27 states have introduced No Pass, No Drive laws, which tie a teenager’s ability
to receive and maintain a driver’s license to various school-related outcomes – most commonly,
enrollment and attendance. Truancy-Based No Pass, No Drive policies target only attendance –
teens that fail to meet a minimum attendance requirement lose their driver’s license. However,
these policies allow students to drop out of school without facing this penalty. These policies
increase the annual dropout rate by between 32 and 45 percent (1.4 to 2 percentage points).
Enrollment-Based No Pass, No Drive policies, the largest group of policies, which target both
enrollment and attendance, have negligible effects on dropout rates, but decrease the Averaged
Freshman Graduation Rate (AFGR) by more than one percentage point. However, this lower
graduation rate stems from students delaying their dropout decision by up to two years. As
a result, these students are retained in the ninth and tenth grades, increasing ninth grade
enrollment by 2.8 percent relative to eighth grade enrollment the year prior; this causes an
artificial reduction in the graduation rate, rather than a reduction in the true likelihood that
a student will graduate.
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1 Introduction
Over the past 30 years, attempting to lower dropout rates and raise graduation rates has been
a central focal point of education policy on both the state and national level. At first glance,
this increased attention has improved these two educational outcomes – The National Center for
Education Statistics’ (NCES) Trends in High School Dropout and Completion Rates in the United
States: 1972–2012 reports that the “status dropout rate,” or the proportion of 16-24 year-olds who
are not enrolled in high school and do not have a high school diploma or equivalency certificate, fell
from 14.6 percent in 1972 to 6.6 percent in 2012. Likewise, the proportion of 18-24 year olds who
have completed high school or an equivalent program has risen from 82.8 percent in 1972 to 91.3
percent in 2012. However, this rise in high school completion is predominantly due to an increase
in GED recipiency. Studies such as Cameron and Heckman (1993) and Heckman et al. (2011)
show both that the value of equivalency certificates such as the GED is far less than the value of
a high school diploma, and that the rate of GED recipiency has risen dramatically over the past
30 years. In addition, Haney et al. (2004) show that the on-time graduation rate fell from 79%
in the early 1980s to 74.4% in 2000-01. As a result, public policymakers have shifted their focus
from ensuring teens complete high school or an equivalency program to ensuring teens graduate
from high school on time. This study focuses on No Pass, No Drive (NPND) laws – a widespread,
low-cost incentive program tying teens’ ability to receive and maintain a driver’s license to their
enrollment, attendance, behavior, and/or performance in school – and examines how these laws
affect dropout rates, on-time graduation rates, and grade-by-grade enrollment across the country.
In 1988, West Virginia enacted the first No Pass, No Drive law in response to growing problems
with dropout rates and graduation rates, especially in rural areas. West Virginia, as do most states
with NPND policies, mandates that teenagers must be enrolled in and attending school regularly
in order to receive and maintain a driver’s license. When students fall below a minimum atten-
dance threshold, or withdraw from school entirely, the school contacts the state’s licensing office
and instructs them to suspend the teen’s license. Early anecdotal evidence suggested that NPND
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policies were successful in their goal of keeping teens in school. In a 1989 New York Times article,1
West Virginia school officials credited the enactment of the state’s NPND law with a 1-2 percent
reduction in the annual dropout rate (from approximately 5 percent to 3.4 percent). Following
the early results in West Virginia, 26 more states enacted their own versions of NPND policies in
an effort to recreate the early success of West Virginia’s policy. I look at the enactment of these
27 policies, exploiting variation in the timing of their enactment between states and examining
differences between groups of these policies, to identify the causal effects of these policies on various
educational outcomes.
A small group of No Pass, No Drive laws are aimed at preventing truancy – a student who is
enrolled in school and habitually absent will lose his or her driver’s license. Importantly, however,
these teens can drop out of school without penalty, and a teen who previously lost his or her license
due to this law can even have their license reinstated (after a waiting period in some states). I show
that this group of policies increases the event dropout rate, or the proportion of students who drop
out of school in a single academic year, by between 1.4 and 2 percentage points. These policies
also lower the Averaged Freshman Graduation Rate (AFGR) by 5 percentage points. In all of the
states in this policy group, students can first receive their driver’s license at age 16 and can first
drop out of school at age 16, so these policies should have a greater impact on 10th graders than
on other grades in high school, as students typically turn 16 in their 10th grade year. I show that,
from October of 10th grade to October of 11th grade the following year, enrollment falls by 2.7
percent more than expected in these states, indicating that students are responding to the threat
of having their license revoked by dropping out of school immediately upon turning 16.
The largest group of policies, in 20 states, targets both truancy and enrollment – these states
close the “dropout loophole” mentioned above and require students to be enrolled in school and
attending regularly in order to receive and maintain a driver’s license. As expected, these policies
do not increase the dropout rate, having no effect on the likelihood a student will drop out of school.
1“West Virginia Reduces Dropouts by Denying them Driver’s License.” The New York Times, May 21, 1989.
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However, these policies cause a 1.3% reduction in the AFGR, an unintuitive result. I investigate
two potential mechanisms for this graduation rate decrease. First, this could be caused by a reduc-
tion in the true four-year graduation rate; that is, these policies could reduce the likelihood a teen
will graduate with a regular high school diploma within four years. Alternatively, since the AFGR
accounts for 9th and 10th grade enrollment in its denominator, it could fall as a result of students
delaying their dropout decisions; a student who would drop out at the age of 16 in the absence of
NPND laws may instead drop out at 18 in order to keep his or her drivers’ license. If these delayed
dropouts are retained in the 9th and/or 10th grades, then the dropout rate would be unaffected
overall, but the denominator of the AFGR would be larger, causing a decline in the AFGR. I find
that NPND policies cause 9th grade enrollment to be 2.8 percent larger than expected, given 8th
grade enrollment the year prior, suggesting that NPND policies delay student dropout decisions. I
additionally test alternative graduation rate estimates that do not depend on 9th and 10th grade
enrollment, and find no evidence to suggest that the true four-year graduation rate is affected by
NPND policies. Thus, while the “Truancy-Based” policies increase the true dropout rate and de-
crease the true likelihood a student will graduate from high school, the “Enrollment-Based” policies
that target truancy and enrollment cause an artificial reduction in the graduation rate, distorting
the perceived quality of education in these states without actually directly affecting the true quality
of education.
My results also inform the literature on behavioral incentive responses, particularly in relation
to education incentive schemes. A number of studies have examined positive educational incentive
schemes, such as Mexico’s PROGRESA (Behrman et al. 2005) and Colombia’s PACES (Angrist
et al. 2002), finding that providing monetary incentives for attendance and enrollment successfully
increase both attendance and enrollment. However, these policies are quite expensive to maintain,
so many policymakers have turned to negative incentive schemes in attempts to boost enrollment
and attendance. These policies penalize truancy and/or dropping out of school, and typically have
much lower monetary costs to implement and maintain them. One negative incentive policy, Wis-
consin’s Learnfare policy, penalizes students who drop out of school or fail to meet an attendance
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target by sanctioning the family’s welfare grant. Dee (2011) finds that Learnfare had large effects on
enrollment and daily attendance when properly implemented, and ambiguous effects when poorly
implemented. No Pass, No Drive laws are an example of a widespread, low-cost negative incentive
scheme, where the incentives are poorly aligned. Both Behavior-Based and Truancy-Based NPND
policies have easily exploitable loopholes where teens can avoid the penalty without modifying their
behavior in the manner lawmakers intended. This creates an interesting comparison – positive in-
centive schemes with misaligned incentives would typically result in wasted money; teens could
gain the reward without modifying their behavior. However, negative incentives schemes with mis-
aligned incentives may motivate students to modify their behavior in undesirable ways. No Pass,
No Drive policies provide a clear example of this rarely-noticed risk of negative incentive policies –
in trying to prevent students from dropping out of school or skipping school, the two main types of
NPND policies cause large increases in the 9th grade retention rate and the annual dropout rate,
respectively.
Only three other papers have empirically examined No Pass, No Drive policies previously.2
Krimmel (2000) performs a time-series analysis of the initial rollout of these policies in Kentucky,
finding that counties enacting NPND policies saw an 11 percent reduction in their dropout rate,
while counties not enacting these policies only saw an 8 percent reduction. More closely related to
my study is Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014), who focus on the effects of NPND policies nation-
wide on educational attainment and student time use. They show that students decrease leisure
and work hours and increase time allocated to schoolwork. They connect this to an increase in the
fraction of men and black individuals with high school diplomas, as well as increases in completion
rates of grades 10 and 11. A second working paper by Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2016) looks at
the effects on juvenile crime, finding that males aged 16 to 18 show a reduction in violent, drug-
related, and property crime as a result of NPND policies. My analysis, in contrast to the previous
literature, is the first national study on how heterogeneous NPND policies affect their targeted
educational outcomes – dropout rates and on-time graduation rates, as well as grade-by-grade re-
2These papers are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2
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tention rates – using data measured contemporaneously with the policies’ enactments.
My analysis of No Pass, No Drive policies makes three main contributions to the literature on
NPND laws, and, more generally, incentive programs and their effects on teen behavior. First, I
perform the first analysis of the effects of NPND policies on their targeted outcomes – dropout
rates and graduation rates. Second, I am the first to examine how students respond to NPND poli-
cies differently at each grade level.3 This study is the first to explore the heterogeneous education
requirements of NPND laws, and is the first national study to analyze NPND effects contemporane-
ously with their implementation. Third, in my grade-by-grade examination, I demonstrate an issue
with using the AFGR, and by extension, any graduation rate estimate that does not track students
year-to-year, as a measure of policy outcomes – that graduation rates can be significantly biased
in the presence of policies and programs that distort enrollment. Specifically, I show that rather
than reducing the number or true rate of graduates, which would contradict the existing literature,
Enrollment-based NPND policies increase enrollment in 9th and 10th grades relative to their initial
cohort size in 8th grade. Truancy-based NPND policies, however, cause students to drop out of
school and reduce the number of graduates per year. This provides an interesting scenario – both
Enrollment- and Truancy-based NPND policies lower graduation rate estimates, but the decrease
in the Enrollment-based states does not stem from a reduction in the true graduation rate, while
the decrease in Truancy-based states does. This peculiarity with Enrollment-based NPND policies
is also not unique to the AFGR; any estimate that includes 9th and/or 10th grade enrollment in the
denominator will be negatively affected by this type of NPND policy. The AFGR was the bench-
mark graduation rate statistic used by the U.S. Department of Education from 2004-2012 under the
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) to determine Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). NPND policies,
by lowering the AFGR, decreased the likelihood of schools, districts, and states of meeting their
respective AYP standards, and likely resulted in a number of schools being designated for “improve-
ment” that, in the absence of NPND policies, would have otherwise met their graduation rate goals.
3Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014), due to their data structure, cannot examine how promotion and retention
behavior changes within each grade level. They can only examine students’ final educational attainment.
6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the history of No Pass,
No Drive policies, including a list of each policy across the country and their attributes, as well as
a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data sources and estimation strategy
employed. Section 4 presents the primary results, explains the forces driving my results, and
presents a set of robustness checks to demonstrate validity of my findings, as well as to show a lack
of alternative explanations for my results. Section 5 discusses the impact of No Pass, No Drive
policies under the No Child Left Behind Act and provides concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Policy Details
Starting with West Virginia in 1988, 27 states have passed laws linking student behavior, at-
tendance, and performance to their ability to receive and maintain a drivers’ license. Differing
from the previous work on these policies, I categorize these policies into groups to more closely
examine the effectiveness of the various incentives. For example, the first of these policies, in West
Virginia, only allows a license to be held by a student who “maintains current school enrollment
and is making satisfactory academic progress.”4 The policy in Nevada states that “If a child is
adjudicated to be in need of supervision because the child is a habitual truant, the juvenile court
shall . . . order the suspension of the driver’s license of the child”5 The policy in West Virginia
requires school enrollment and “satisfactory academic progress,” while the Nevada policy only re-
quires the student not be a truant. This allows teens to change their behavior in Nevada to avoid
punishment under this policy; truant teens can drop out of school and no longer be classified as
truant, thus allowing them to maintain their license. Additionally, a third type of policy in Kansas
states that “Whenever a pupil who has attained the age of 13 years has been found in possession
of a weapon or illegal drug at school, . . . the division of vehicles immediately shall suspend the
pupil’s driver’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.”6 Clearly, these are three different
4West Virginia Annotated Code, §17B-2-3a(2)(E)
5Nevada Revised Statutes, §62E.430
6Kansas Statute Annotated, §72-89c02(a)-(c)
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policies, attempting to curb different problems, and so examining them as if they were a single
policy aimed at reducing dropout rates and raising graduation rates would inaccurately identify the
full effect of those policies that do target these rates. To solve this, I classify the policies into three
groups – Enrollment-Based policies, as in West Virginia, which directly target high school dropouts
and truants, Truancy-Based policies, as in Nevada, which target truants but not dropouts, and
Behavior-Based policies, as in Kansas, which target school discipline. These groupings, as well as
some unique features of these policies, are shown in Table 1.
Except for the case of Kentucky (see footnote 25), no NPND policy has ever been repealed; all 27
of these policies are currently ongoing. Implementing these policies requires coordination between
local education agencies and the drivers’ license issuing offices. For example, some states, such as
Kentucky, have an electronic communication system in place between schools and the Kentucky
Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing, so that a student failing to meet the requirements to keep
his or her license at school will be automatically “flagged” in the system (Krimmel 2000). In con-
trast, states like Texas have no such electronic communication system in place. Instead, students
in Texas must take a form confirming their enrollment and attendance for the past 180 days in to
the Texas Department of Public Safety in order to receive a learner’s permit at age 15, to receive a
graduated drivers’ license at age 16, and to renew the license at age 17 (TX Transportation Code
7B-521-003). Thus, heterogeneity across states in reporting student activity and in enforcing these
policies is present. However, due to the subjectiveness of attempting to categorize these systems, as
well as uncertainty on how such electronic systems have been implemented over time, I am unable
to examine the effects of differing reporting systems on student outcomes.
I am also unable to directly link enforcement of these policies to student outcomes, as data on
revocation and suspension of licenses under NPND policies are generally unavailable. A potential
concern would be that the policy (i) does not affect enough teens, or (ii) is not strictly enforced,
so that the impact on education statistics for the entire population of high school students would
be imperceptible. However, a 2006 nationally representative survey of teen drivers estimates that
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nearly 75% of 9th-11th graders drive regularly, either on their own or with a driving instructor or
parent (“Driving Through the Eyes of Teens...” 2009). By 11th grade, only 10% of teens do not
drive at all, suggesting No Pass, No Drive policies would affect almost all high school students. The
relevant results of this survey are reproduced in Table A3 in the appendix. Additionally, although
enforcement numbers are not available in most states for most years, a 2011 policy brief from the
Southern Regional Education Board reports these numbers for four states (Lenard 2011). The full
set of enforcement numbers available is reproduced in Table A4 in the appendix, as well as counts
of driver’s licenses held by teens in those states from the US Federal Highway Administration in
2009. Tennessee has the lowest annual suspension rate, at 2.8% of licenses suspended per year.
The other three reporting states suspend over 10% of all teen licenses per year, suggesting these
policies are generally enforced, but with some heterogeneity.7 Although I cannot test the degree of
enforcement of these policies directly, it appears that No Pass, No Drive policies are enforced and,
more importantly, that teens in the United States drive regularly.
2.2 Relevant Literature
Only three studies, to my knowledge, have empirically examined the effects of No Pass, No Drive
policies. Krimmel (2000) was the first to perform an empirical study of the effects of No Pass, No
Drive policies on educational outcomes. His time-series analysis of a quasi-natural experiment in
Kentucky showed that counties that enacted NPND laws saw an 11 percent reduction in the dropout
rate, while the comparison group of counties that did not enact NPND laws only saw an 8 percent
reduction in the dropout rate. My analysis differs from Krimmel’s in a few key dimensions. First,
my analysis is on a national level, exploiting timing differences in the enactment of NPND policies
to identify their effects, while Krimmel’s only identifies the effect of Kentucky’s NPND laws. Thus,
my results should provide greater external validity in informing policy decisions. Second, Krimmel
only investigates the effects of NPND laws on dropout rates, while I am able to identify the effects of
NPND laws on four-year graduation rates, individual grade enrollments, and dropout rates. Finally,
7Florida suspended 3.4% of all licenses in the 3rd quarter of 2009, for an estimated annual suspension rate of
13.7%.
9
and most importantly, Krimmel’s policy analysis is conflated with the simultaneous enactment of
dropout prevention counseling programs in the treatment counties, meaning that Krimmel’s results
should be interpreted as the effect of NPND laws in conjunction with dropout prevention counsel-
ing, while my analysis, by examining these policies nationwide and exploiting heterogeneous timing
of NPND enactment, is able to identify the impact of NPND policies separately and more accurately.
The only other works to empirically study No Pass, No Drive policies are two studies by Barua
and Vidal-Fernandez (2014, 2016). Their 2014 study examines NPND policies on a national level,
primarily focusing on the effects of NPND policies on student time use and educational attainment.
Using the 2009-11 rounds of the American Community Survey (ACS), they assign treatment to
individuals based on their age and state of birth. Individuals born in a state with a NPND law
who were under the age of 13 when the policy was enacted are considered treated, and individuals
aged 19 or older are untreated.8 Individuals aged 14 to 18 in the year their state’s NPND law was
enacted are omitted from the estimation. The authors perform difference-in-differences estimation
identified using between-state and between-birth cohort variation. They show that NPND policies
increase the proportion of young adults who have a high school diploma by approximately 1 per-
centage point, and demonstrate stronger effects on males (1-2%), blacks (1-4%), and particularly
black males (3-7%). They also demonstrate that educational attainment increases by 0.02 to 0.05
years on average, and that students spend approximately 0.2 more hours per week on schoolwork
as a result of NPND laws.
My work has two clear advantages over that of Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014). First, I
can identify the educational effects of these policies contemporaneously with their implementation.
My data are taken from annual reports from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES),
meaning that I can identify which state-year pairs are treated in a much cleaner manner than is
possible in the ACS.9 Barua and Vidal-Fernandez omit individuals aged 14-18 when the NPND
8The earliest age at which a person could be affected by a NPND policy is 13, as Alabama, California, and Kansas
provided learner’s permits at age 13 when these NPND laws were enacted.
9A potential threat to this strategy is how to assign treatment when policies are enacted during an academic year.
I use October 1st as the cutoff date for treatment, as enrollment and dropout counts are measured nationwide in
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policy was enacted, meaning that any effects in the first three to five years of an NPND policy are
unobservable in their study. Second, I separate NPND policies into three types based on the group
of students they target. As previously mentioned in Section 2.1, some NPND policies target both
dropouts and truants, some target only truants, and some target neither; my study is the first to
identify these policies as potentially having different effects. Furthermore, my study is primarily a
policy analysis – I investigate whether NPND policies are achieving their goals of increasing on-time
graduation rates and lowering dropout rates, while Barua and Vidal-Fernandez look only at the
final educational attainment of teens, then examine the behavioral responses of teens to these poli-
cies. However, though Barua and Vidal-Fernandez show a number of unambiguous positive effects
of NPND policies, I demonstrate that the largest group of laws cause an increase in grade retention
in 9th and 10th grades that exceeds any increase in the number of graduates. My estimates suggest
that two to three times more students are retained in the 9th and 10th grades than Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez find graduate due to NPND policies.10 I also show that a smaller group of laws
is extremely problematic, causing a substantial number of students to drop out of school entirely.
Despite these differences, my results do not directly contradict any of Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s
findings; it is likely that NPND policies moderately increase high school completion and educational
attainment, but cause large increases in 9th grade retention.
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2016) look at the effects of No Pass, No Drive policies on juvenile
crime. Using the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, they examine how the passage of an NPND policy
affected violent crimes, property crimes, drug crimes, and DUI offenses for teenage males and fe-
males aged 16-18. This study examines NPND policies contemporaneously, unlike their 2014 study,
and compares the effects of NPND policies to the well-known effects of compulsory schooling laws on
crime (Lochner and Moretti 2004, Anderson 2014). Using a difference-in-differences framework with
state-specific linear trends, they show that both males and females have a 0.06 percentage point
decrease in crime, primarily driven by drops in violent crime (0.11 percentage points) and property
early October, and reported to the NCES in mid- to late October.
10Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s results suggest that for every 1,000 students, an additional 12 will graduate due to
NPND policies. I show in Figure 1 that for every 1,000 students under an Enrollment-based policy, an additional 34
will be retained in 9th and 10th grades due to NPND policies.
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crime (0.1-0.13 percentage points). They then perform a triple difference, using variation in 20-24
year olds’ crime rate as a comparison group to remove potential state-year level crime shocks, finding
similar, but larger results. My results complement these results, suggesting retention and incapaci-
tation as potential mechanisms for the reduction in crime rates among teens affected by NPND laws.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data Sources
I collected information on the details of these policies from each state’s code of laws and leg-
islative histories. I then merged this policy information with data on student outcomes and school
spending taken from the National Center for Education Statistics. The NCES’s Common Core of
Data (CCD) has public-use state-level data on dropout rates, graduation rates, diploma counts,
and enrollments.11 Data on grade enrollments from grade 8 to grade 12, as well as total diploma
recipients, were taken from the State Nonfiscal Public Elementary/Secondary Education Survey
datasets available on the NCES website. I assembled a panel dataset from the state-level enroll-
ment files from 1986-87 to 2012-13. The data are missing the number of diplomas in 1986-87, as
well as from 2010-11 to 2012-13. For school years from 2005-06 to 2009-10, data on the number of
diploma recipients in each state were taken from the CCD’s State Dropout and Completion Data
Files.
Pre-constructed graduation rates are unavailable in a consistent and accurate form across all
years of my dataset. With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001, the US
Department of Education (DoE) mandated that states begin implementing more accurate measures
of four-year graduation rates. As a result, attempting to link the NCES’s graduation rates, which
are self-reported by each state, and do not follow a consistent formula, before and after 2001 would
11Although district-level data are available, they only begin in 1997 and are highly incomplete, and as such are
not used in my analysis.
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create severe inconsistencies in my analysis. To circumvent this issue, I use the Averaged Freshman
Graduation Rate (AFGR), proposed by Greene and Winters (2002), which is an easily calculable
graduation rate statistic that only requires state-level grade enrollment data. The AFGR was the
standard graduation rate used by the US DoE from 2005-2012 in determining school- and district-
level adequate yearly progress under NCLB, and is generally considered to be a good estimate of
on-time graduation rates, given limited available data.12 The AFGR is calculated for each state
(s), in every year (t) using the formula below:
AFGRs,t =
Diplomass,t ∗ 3
Grade 8s,t−4 +Grade 9s,t−3 +Grade 10s,t−2
∗ 100
Simply put, the AFGR uses the average enrollment for a single cohort from 8th to 10th grade as the
“enrollment base” from which the four-year graduation rate is calculated. As a result of this formula
and the available data, the AFGR is calculated from 1990 to 2009. I use the AFGR, as opposed to
educational attainment in the full population as in Barua and Vidal-Fernandez, to provide a policy
analysis more aligned with the interests of policymakers and educational agencies. The US DoE’s
Race to the Top program, implemented in 2011, challenges states to achieve four-year graduation
rates of 90% by the year 2020, so a four-year graduation rate is a more appropriate statistic to
study than overall educational attainment in a state-level policy analysis such as this.13
Dropout rates were taken from the NCES’s annual Dropout Rates in the United States reports.
The NCES uses an event dropout rate definition, which is calculated as the total number of stu-
dents that have dropped out of grades 9-12 since October of the previous academic year, divided
by total enrollment in grades 9-12 in that year. This means event dropout rates have a built-in
lag structure, where the event dropout rate reported in October of academic year t is primarily
made up of students who dropped out of school in academic year t− 1. This is in contrast to other
agencies that report status dropout rates, which are the fraction of people of schooling age (typically
12See Heckman and LaFontaine (2012) for an overview of various graduation rate statistics used in the United
States, and a comparison of the AFGR to graduation rate estimates from other sources.
13On-time graduation rate estimates also have the advantage of being measured contemporaneously with NPND
policy implementation, while educational attainment must be measured after individuals complete their education.
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ages 15-21) that are not currently enrolled in school and have not completed school. Since these
No Pass, No Drive policies often have grandfathering clauses, where students that have already
dropped out of school before the policy takes effect do not lose their licenses, the event dropout
rate is a more appropriate statistic for examining the early years of the policy. Additionally, status
dropout rates typically consider individuals up to age 21, while NPND policies only affect those
under the age of 18. Event dropout rates are used from 1990 to 2011, as these are the only years for
which data are available. Additionally, approximately 20% of the observations in this time period
are missing. The states with NPND policies are missing fewer observations, however – approxi-
mately 15%. I also took data on total expenditures on public schooling per pupil from the NCES’s
Elementary/Secondary Information System (ELSi), and state unemployment rates were taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1987-2013. All 50 states are used in this study; data are
missing for some state-year pairs’ dropout rates and diploma counts, but never for grade-by-grade
enrollment. Summary statistics for the dependent variables and controls are listed in Table 2 below.
3.2 Estimation Methods
I aim to identify the impact of No Pass, No Drive laws on state average dropout rates and
graduation rates. This is done by exploiting variation in the time of passage of these laws among
the twenty states with Enrollment-Based policies, the four states with Truancy-Based policies, and
the three states with Behavior-Based policies. The na¨ıve regression model of interest is below:
Yst = β0 + β1EnrollBasedst + β2TruancyBasedst + β3BehaviorBasedst + εst
Above, the variables Enroll-Based, Truancy-Based, and Behavior-Based are binary – EnrollBasedst
is set equal to 1 if state s has an Enrollment-Based policy in place at time t and equal to 0 otherwise,
and likewise for Truancy- and Behavior-Based. The outcome variable, Yst, is either the dropout
rate or AFGR, depending on the regression.14
14Given the timing involved in calculation of the AFGR, the first 2 years of NPND policies will only affect the
numerator (number of diplomas), not the denominator (enrollment base). However, ex ante there is no justifiable
14
In order to account for differences in educational quality and economic climate between the
states with and without these policies, I include a pair of control variables mentioned previously
– per-student public schooling expenditures and state unemployment rates. I also include state
and year fixed effects to control for baseline differences between states and the overall downward
trends observed in both dropout rates and graduation rates over the past 25 years. Finally, I
include state-specific linear time trends to correct for additional state-level trends in dropout rates
and graduation rates differing from the overall trend. A cursory glance at the data suggests that
states that initially have low dropout rates and/or graduation rates saw those numbers fall to
a lesser extent than states with high rates.15 I perform difference-in-differences estimation with
state-specific linear trends using the regression model below:
Yst =β0 + β1EnrollBasedst + β2TruancyBasedst + β3BehaviorBasedst
+ β4log(Spending)st + β5Unempst + δt + γs + γs ∗ t+ εst
Because I include state and year fixed effects and state-specific linear trends in this regression model,
this estimating equation is well-identified given the “parallel paths” assumption – that the states
without the policy represent a valid counterfactual for the growth path of the outcome variable
in states enacting the policy. The potential threat to identification then, would be within-state
deviations from their linear trends that are correlated with, but not caused by, the implementation
of No Pass, No Drive policies. The coefficients β1, β2, and β3 are the parameters of interest in
this regression, and, assuming the identifying assumption above holds, should be interpreted as the
causal effect of these No Pass, No Drive policies on dropout rates and graduation rates.
reason to reassign the start dates of treatment, as NPND policies have the potential to affect both the number of
diplomas and the enrollment base.
15Section 4.2 further discusses why my preferred specification includes state-specific linear time trends.
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4 Results
Table 3 shows the primary regression results, using the model specification described in Sec-
tion 3.2 and the dropout rate as the dependent variable. In Table 3 and the remainder of the
paper, all reported standard errors are the typical cluster-robust standard errors. However, the
Enrollment-based policies use the typical t-distribution in hypothesis testing, while the Truancy-
and Behavior-based policies use a t-distribution generated from the bootstrap procedure described
in Cameron et al. (2008).16
Column (1) shows the na¨ıve regression results on dropout rates, demonstrating that the states
with the No Pass, No Drive policies have below-average dropout rates. This suggests that a
difference-in-differences approach, as in columns (2)-(5), is necessary to establish causality. Columns
(4) and (5) include the full set of controls, and are the main results. It is important to note here
that, based on the event dropout rate definition, the dropout rate would only be temporarily influ-
enced by students delaying their dropout decision. So, for example, if a student subject to one of
these policies at age 16 decides to drop out of school at age 18, when they no longer are affected
by the policy, the policy coefficient would remain unchanged. Looking at columns (4) and (5),
Enrollment-Based policies have no significant effect on dropout rates, indicating that any students
who do change their dropout behavior based on this policy are delaying their dropout decision.
Truancy-Based policies, alternatively, increase the dropout rate by 1.229 percentage points per
year – the mean dropout rate is 4.42%, so approximately 32% more students drop out of school
each year than would have otherwise. Recall the incentives at work in these policies – a habitual
truant will lose his or her driving privileges, but a dropout will not in these states. Additionally,
16Section A in the appendix describes inference for Truancy- and Behavior-based policies. In Table A1 in the
appendix, placebo testing shows that analysis on the truancy-based policies suffers from severe type I error; to
correct for this, I use the wild cluster bootstrap-t as in Cameron et al. (2008). This method corrects for type I error
in difference-in-differences estimation when implementing clustered standard errors with rarely-treated clusters, and
allows for proper statistical inference. The cluster-robust standard error estimates are presented, as opposed to a
bootstrapped standard error estimate, because the cluster-robust estimate is used to calculate the Wald statistic
used for inference. The bootstrap procedure tests the typical Wald statistic generated from OLS estimation against
a bootstrap t-distribution of Wald statistics, so the appropriate standard error to report is the typical cluster-robust
standard error estimate. The coefficients and standard error estimates presented in all tables are unaffected by the
bootstrap procedure, and only the p-values and significance indicators are affected for the Truancy- and Behavior-
Based policies.
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as mentioned in the description of my data previously, the event dropout rate has a built-in lag,
meaning my estimates of the policy effect on dropout rates likely face attenuation bias – the first
year of treatment in my analysis often includes the majority of an academic year in which the
policy was not in effect. To test this, and to confirm that the first-year effect is not having an
unexpected impact on my results, in Table A5 in the appendix I use a “Donut Treatment” specifi-
cation where I omit the first year of treatment from my analysis.17 This specification suggests the
Truancy-based policies increase the event dropout rate by 1.98 percentage points. I interpret these
two estimates of the treatment effects as bounds on the true effect – that Truancy-based policies
increase the dropout rate by between 1.4 and 1.98 percentage points, or 32 and 45 percent. Addi-
tionally, Figure A1 in the appendix shows the raw dropout rates and the rates controlling for all
covariates in the main regression for the three states used for identification. These graphs indicate
the effect is primarily occurring in Delaware and New Mexico, with less dramatic effects in Nevada.18
Table 4 shows the primary regression results on Averaged Freshman Graduation Rates. Again,
column (1) shows the na¨ıve regression results, demonstrating that the states with No Pass, No
Drive policies have below average AFGRs. Interestingly, however, after including the full set of
controls, column (4) shows the treatment effect of the policy is still negative, implying that these
policies are reducing graduation rates in some meaningful way. Additionally, adding the spending
and unemployment controls in moving from column (3) to column (4) increased the magnitude of
the coefficient estimate and decreased the standard error, suggesting that omitted variable bias
is unlikely to be the force driving this surprising result. Moving from column (4) to (5) removes
the significance from the enrollment-based coefficient, with only a small change on the point esti-
mate. This is likely driven by Louisiana and Oregon, as they switch from Behavior-based policies
to Enrollment-based policies, rather than from no policy to Enrollment-based policies. Table A6
excludes Louisiana and Oregon from this analysis, and shows an almost identical Enrollment-based
coefficient to that in column (4), suggesting the effect here is only marginally significant, but still
17This is preferred to simply reassigning treatment one year later, as the first year of treatment is partially treated.
Reassigning treatment would likely cause similar attenuation bias to my main specification.
18California is omitted, as the pre-NPND dropout rate data are not available.
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requires further investigation. Column (4) also shows that the Truancy-based NPND policies have
a negative effect on AFGR, while the other Behavior-Based states have a positive, but small and
insignificant effect; Truancy-based policies, by causing an increase in the dropout rate, also reduce
the true graduation rate. However, this does not explain the negative coefficient on the Enrollment-
Based policy. The following section discusses the importance of the AFGR, and investigates the
potential causes of this AFGR reduction.
4.1 No Pass, No Drive Laws and the AFGR
Upon passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001, states were pushed to improve test
scores, attendance rates, and graduation rates nationwide. Each secondary school was required
to report various annual measures of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) – four test score measures
and an on-time graduation rate measure– that would determine the district’s and schools’ levels
and status of federal education funding. From 2005 to 2012, this on-time graduation rate was the
AFGR. Given the effects of the Truancy- and Enrollment-based policies on the AFGR, it is crucial
to investigate the underlying causes and mechanisms of this AFGR reduction.
Based on the way in which AFGR is calculated, there are two mechanisms by which these No
Pass, No Drive policies could be reducing the AFGR in Table 4. The policy could be decreasing
the numerator – that is, reducing the number of diplomas handed out each year. This is likely
the cause of the large, negative Truancy-Based coefficient, but is unlikely for Enrollment-Based
policies; the incentives created by these Enrollment-Based NPND policies would in no way lead me
to expect students to respond by failing to graduate. Alternatively, this policy could be increasing
the denominator – that is, increasing enrollment in 8th, 9th, and/or 10th grades. In addressing
these two possibilities, an important feature of the US education system needs to be mentioned –
the so-called “ninth grade bottleneck”.
A number of papers have noted that ninth grade retention rates are extremely high in the United
States, and have grown drastically over the past 50-60 years. McCallumore and Sparapani (2010)
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estimate that approximately 22% of students repeat at least some 9th grade classes. This has
increased 9th grade enrollment to the point where it is an entirely inaccurate measure of a single
grade cohort’s size. The AFGR was created, in part, to correct for this very issue; it reduces the
impact of 9th grade enrollment on graduation rates by factoring in estimated cohort size, using 8th
and 10th grade enrollments to smooth the estimated enrollment base. To identify the effect the No
Pass, No Drive policies have on the AFGR, I first consider how these policies affect year-to-year
enrollment changes for a particular cohort. Using the CCD enrollment data I construct a number
of dependent variables showing year-to-year enrollment changes for a single cohort. For example,
the 8th to 9th grade enrollment change is calculated as:
% Change 8th− 9ths,t = 9th Grade Enrollments,t − 8th Grade Enrollments,t−1
8th Grade Enrollments,t−1
∗ 100%
Alternatively, I could use log(Enrollment) as the dependent variable in these regressions. I use
the percentage changes in grade enrollment to better account for between-cohort variation in size,
and also to more clearly show the lack of promotion out of the 9th grade. Table 2 demonstrates
the “9th grade bottleneck” – 9th grade is on average nearly 9% larger than 8th grade, indicating
a great number of students repeat the 9th grade at least once. In addition, many students will
repeat the 9th grade until they drop out of school. 9th grade retention rates have fallen since the
year 2000, likely due to improvements in school quality and the introduction of policies directed
at reducing this effect. However, it still remains true that 9th grade enrollments are much larger
than would be expected given 8th grade enrollments – 7.9% larger in 2012 – indicating that 9th
grade retention is still a problem. Raw dropout counts show that 9th grade dropouts and 11th
grade dropouts are roughly equal in number; however, due to compulsory schooling until the age
of 16, 9th graders should be unable to drop out of school unless they have repeated a grade.19 The
enrollment changes in Table 2 show that after 9th grade, enrollment numbers fall every year as one
would expect. Although the AFGR was created to reduce the bias caused by the 9th grade pooling
19Numbers and Rates of Public High School Dropouts: School Year 2004-05 shows 125,115 9th graders and 125,882
11th graders dropped out of school in 2004-05.
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effect, if these policies are causing a disparate impact in any one grade then the AFGR would be
still be influenced, even if the “true” four-year graduation rate is unaffected. I begin by directly
examining the effect of Truancy- and Enrollment-based NPND policies on the 9th grade bottle-
neck, and then show that a reduction in graduates causes only the Truancy-based policy AFGR
reduction, not the Enrollment-based effect. Table 5 looks at the 9th grade bottleneck, showing
results from a regression specified identically to the previous regressions examining dropout and
graduation rates, including the same set of controls, but using percentage enrollment changes as
the dependent variable.
Table 5 shows important effects of the Enrollment-Based policies. First, note in column (1) that
the coefficient on per-student spending is large and negative. This indicates that the 9th grade
pooling effect is correlated with low-quality, or at least poorly funded, schooling. Compare this to
the Enrollment-Based policy effect; the policy increases the gap between 8th and 9th grade enroll-
ment, and it may make the 9th to 10th grade attrition rate larger as well, although this coefficient
is not significant. Clearly, this is evidence that the Enrollment-Based policy increases the rate of
pooling in 9th grade, constricting the 9th grade bottleneck to an even greater degree than before
the policy was implemented. To understand why this occurs, consider the type of student affected
by this policy – before the policy, many students were dropping out of school at the age of 16,
but with the policy, they wait until they turn 18. The results in Table 3 indicated that dropout
rates were not significantly affected by this policy, so it must be that the policy is simply causing
students to delay their dropout decision. Without the policy, many of these “marginal” students –
those who would have changed their behavior under these No Pass, No Drive policies – are retained
in 9th grade until they drop out at age 16. With the policy, the primary difference is that these
marginal students are retained in 9th grade an additional 1 or 2 years, eventually dropping out at
age 18.
Additionally, Table 5 verifies the results from Table 3 regarding the effects of Truancy-based
policies on dropout rates. The majority of states in the time period examined, including all Truancy-
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based states, had compulsory schooling until the age of 16, and also allowed students to receive
their driver’s license at the age of 16. Since students who are progressing through school normally
will be 16 years old in the 10th grade, the result in column (3) is entirely expected – truant teens
drop out of school at the first available opportunity, making the gap between 10th and 11th grade
enrollment larger.
An alternative explanation for the AFGR falling due to the Enrollment-based policies is a de-
crease in the numerator of the AFGR statistic – that these policies reduce the number of diplomas
given out in some meaningful way. I test for this in two ways; first, by using the 12th grade gradua-
tion rate, calculated as before as the ratio of diplomas to 12th grade enrollment in a given academic
year. I also consider a simple five-year graduation rate – calculated as the ratio of diplomas to
8th grade enrollment five years prior. The five-year graduation rate should not be affected by 9th
grade pooling, so while it may be an overall noisier measure of on-time graduation than the AFGR,
Enrollment-based policies should not affect this estimate, while Truancy-based policies should. If
these policies are truly making students graduate at a lower rate, instead of artificially lowering
the AFGR statistic via increasing 9th grade enrollments, the coefficient estimates for these two
specifications, especially the five-year graduation rate, should be negative, significant, and equal in
magnitude to the estimates in Table 4. Table 6 shows the effects of NPND policies on these two
graduation rate estimates.
Column (1) shows the effect on the percentage of 12th graders that graduate in a given year.
No policy has a significant effect, but magnitude of the coefficient on Enrollment-based policies is
less than 1, while the coefficient on Truancy-based policies is nearly 2.5. However, this is a far less
accurate measure of a possible effect of these policies on graduation than the five-year graduation
rate. If some of the “marginal” students under Enrollment-based policies – those who would drop
out at age 16 without the policy but instead wait until they turn 18 – move through school on-track,
meaning they are in 12th grade when they turn 18, then it is reasonable to assume that not only
might these students drop out of the 12th grade, but also the average ability of 12th graders would
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decrease as a result of the policy. A more accurate measure of how these policies affect on-time
graduation rates is the five-year graduation rate. Column (3) shows that the Enrollment-Based
policy effect is negative, relatively small, and insignificant. Truancy-based policies appear to cause
extremely large, but insignificant decreases in the five-year graduation rate, but the other policies
do not have an effect. All of this evidence suggests that, while the Truancy-Based policies reduce
actual graduation rates and increase dropout rates, the Enrollment-Based policies only artificially
reduce the AFGR by increasing 9th grade enrollment.
Additionally, these results do not directly conflict with the findings on educational attainment
in Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s previous work. I find small and insignificant effects on the alter-
native graduation rate estimates in Table 6, while Barua and Vidal-Fernandez find a small, but
significant increase in the proportion of the population with a high school diploma. In Appendix
Table A7 I replicate Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s estimation of the effects of NPND policies on
high school completion in the ACS 2009-2011, categorizing policies into three groups as in my study,
and compare to my analogous results. In the full sample, I find comparable results to Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez for Enrollment-based policies.20 Truancy-based policies appear to have larger ef-
fects than Enrollment-based policies, but further investigation in column (2) shows this is driven by
California. California’s policy is likely to cause similar responses to Enrollment-based policies, as
the minimum dropout age in California is 18, meaning students cannot legally exploit the “dropout
loophole” available in Delaware, Nevada, and New Mexico.21 California is missing dropout data
before their NPND policy, and as a result is not used for identification in my dropout rate estima-
tion. However, California is not missing in my AFGR and enrollment data; my results presented
in Panels B and C of Table A7 are not sensitive to the omission of any individual state with a
Truancy-based policy. This suggests that the differences between my findings and those of Barua
and Vidal-Fernandez are driven primarily by our classification of policies and choices of outcome
variables, and that my study complements theirs, giving a more complete description of the effects
20Here I replicate their most restrictive specification, allowing for state-specific linear and quadratic trends.
21The minimum dropout age in Delaware is 16, in Nevada is 17, with exemptions given to working teens as young
as 14, and in New Mexico is 18, with exemptions given to working teens and teens enrolled in GED study programs.
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of NPND policies on teen educational choices.
To demonstrate the effects NPND policies have on grade-by-grade enrollment more clearly, Fig-
ure 1 shows, for every 1,000 8th graders, how many students are expected to be enrolled at each
grade level.
In Figure 1, the “Without NPND” bars show the average year-to-year enrollment changes among
all 23 states that never begin a NPND policy. The “With NPND” bars add the Enrollment- or
Truancy-based regression results from Table 5 to the “Without NPND” averages, meaning that the
“With NPND” effects show the expected results of a state enacting NPND laws among the states
that do not currently have NPND laws. The number atop each bar shows the estimated size of the
gap between the states with and without NPND policies. There are a few key effects of the NPND
policies that clearly reveal themselves in this graph. First, looking at Graph (a), Enrollment-based
NPND laws have the largest effect in 9th grade. For every 1000 8th graders, 9th grade enrollment
increases by about 28 students as a result of these policies. Second, the negative coefficient on the
9th to 10th grade enrollment change does not cancel out the large, positive coefficient on the 8th to
9th grade enrollment change – 10th grade enrollment is also larger than expected, given 8th grade
enrollment. Finally, the remaining coefficients essentially cancel out the remaining effect. That
is, 11th and 12th grade enrollments and diploma counts are essentially identical when comparing
NPND states to their counterparts without NPND laws. Additionally, recall that none of the coef-
ficients after the 8th to 9th grade change were significantly different from zero. As a result, Figure
1 (a) may be underestimating the size of 10th, 11th, and 12th grades, as well as the number of
diplomas. Overall, the massive increase in 9th grade enrollment and the smaller increase in 10th
grade enrollment are much more likely to be the causes of the AFGR reduction than a decline in
high school graduates.
Looking at Figure 1 (b), the Truancy-based policies show the opposite effect from the Enrollment-
based policies. 9th and 10th grades are unaffected by Truancy-based policies, and there is a sub-
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stantial decrease in 11th and 12th grade enrollment (20-30 students per 1,000 8th graders) and in
the number of graduates caused by these policies. This indicates Truancy-based policies truly cause
an increase in the dropout rate, and that many of the teens who drop out because of these policies
would have otherwise graduated from high school. There appears to be an additional reduction
in the number of graduates, relative to the number of 12th graders. This is likely caused by stu-
dents who become older than their state’s minimum dropout age – in California and New Mexico,
the minimum dropout age is 18 (with numerous exemptions in New Mexico), and in Nevada, the
minimum dropout age is 17. Given this, it is reasonable to expect students to drop out at their
first available opportunity, which occurs in the 10th grade in Delaware or if exempt from com-
pulsory schooling in Nevada and New Mexico, and occurs in the 12th grade otherwise. So while
both Enrollment-based and Truancy-based policies decrease the AFGR, Enrollment-based policies
are distorting enrollment without truly decreasing the number of graduates, while Truancy-based
policies are increasing the number and rate of dropouts and decreasing the true likelihood a teen
will graduate.
4.2 Event Studies
A potential concern with these results is the validity of the identifying assumption – that,
after removing the effects of the spending and unemployemnt controls and state-specific linear time
trends, the dependent variables have parallel trends between states with and states without No Pass,
No Drive policies. To test this, I estimate dynamic diff-in-diff models analogous to the following:
Yst =β0 +
−2∑
i=−3
ηiEnrollStarteds,t+i +
5∑
i=0
ηiEnrollStarteds,t+i + φ
−EnrollStarted4−s,t + φ
+EnrollStarted6+s,t
β2Truancys,t + β3Behaviors,t + β4log(Spending)s,t + β5Unemps,t + δt + γs + γs ∗ t+ εs,t
In the equation above, the terms EnrollStarteds,t+i are binary, equal to 1 i years after the
Enrollment-based policy was first implemented in state s. The terms EnrollStarted4−s,t and EnrollStarted
6+
s,t
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are binary, equal to 1 when the policy begins in 4 or more years22 or has been in place 6 or more
years, respectively. This model normalizes the coefficient 1 year before the policy begins to zero,
for ease of visual interpretation. I collect the coefficient estimates ηt and their standard errors and
graph them in a series of plots in Figures 2 and 3. I also estimate the above equation without
including state-specific linear time trends (γs ∗ t), and present the estimates in Figure 4
In Figure 2, the parallel paths assumption holds well for the dropout rate, as the pre-policy trend
is flat and near zero. Additionally, following implementation of the Truancy-based NPND policies,
the dropout rate rises substantially. For the AFGR and 10th-11th grade enrollment changes, the
pre-policy trend is somewhat concerning. However, if I omit state-specific linear trends as in Figure
4, the pre-policy trend for the AFGR is flat and near zero, and the pre-policy trend for the dropout
rate is concerning. Considering both of these results together, both model specifications suggest
the same effects of Truancy-based NPND policies on event dropout rates and the AFGR, with the
strength of my identification varying depending on the specification used.
In Figure 3, the parallel paths assumption holds well for both the dropout rate and the AFGR
– Enrollment-based NPND policies appear to not affect the annual dropout rate, but decrease the
AFGR. The 8th-9th grade enrollment change is potentially concerning, as the preexisting trend
appears to continue after the policy begins, but the combination of a decline in the AFGR and
no change in dropout rates suggest early high school retention as the most likely cause. In Figure
4(d), the pre-policy noise in estimation for the AFGR makes identification difficult, as the states
with Enrollment-based NPND policies do not appear to satisfy the parallel trends assumption.
Overall, comparing Figures 2 and 3 to Figure 4 shows why I prefer a specification with state-
specific linear trends to one without trends. I find qualitatively and quantitatively similar effects
of Truancy-based policies regardless of which specification I choose, and state-specific linear trends
allow proper identification of the Enrollment-based policies’ effects on the AFGR.
22This is chosen primarily to avoid endpoint effects. For Truancy-based policies, I do not have AFGR or enrollment
data for California for 5+ years before the policy begins. For enrollment policies, 3 of the 20 states do not have data
5 or more years before the policy begins.
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5 Conclusion
Overall, No Pass, No Drive policies do not appear to be as unambiguously beneficial to edu-
cational outcomes as previous studies have found. Of immediate concern to policymakers should
be the effects of Truancy-Based policies, which I am the first to separately identify and study, on
teen decision-making. These policies distort incentives, making absence from school much more
costly without directly altering the costs of dropping out of school. As a result, Truancy-based
policies result in a massive increase in the annual dropout rate, and an associated decrease in the
four-year graduation rate, as well as 11th and 12th grade enrollment. Important to note is that
the students who drop out of school as a result of these policies are ones who likely would have
completed high school without this policy intervention – the dropout rate rises and the true grad-
uation rate falls, indicating that these new dropouts would have completed high school if not for
the policy intervention. This means that Truancy-based NPND policies have strong implications
beyond the contemporaneous education effects, and in fact beyond the teenage years into adult-
hood. Also important to note is the magnitude of the impact of these policies; I calculate that
Truancy-based policies increase the number of dropouts in the United States by over 27,000 teens
per year,23 showing that, despite the relative rarity of these policies, the overall effect is quite large.
Looking at Enrollment-based No Pass, No Drive policies, the effects are more subtle, yet still
quite important. While my analysis is unable to refute previous results that educational attain-
ment increases due to the enactment of Enrollment-based NPND policies, this increase seems to,
at most, marginally improve the number of high school graduates in the population, and does not
seem to improve the number of on-time high school graduates. This slight increase in educational
attainment also carries with it some significant, but previously unnoticed, costs. Enrollment in 9th
grade, relative to 8th grade, increases by nearly 3 percent, and enrollment in 10th grade increases
by approximately 1 percent. This puts pressure on state and local education budgets, as higher
student enrollment numbers would require the hiring of additional teachers and staff, as well as
23High school enrollment for California, Delaware, Nevada, and New Mexico in 2012-13 was about 2.2 million,
multiplied by the Truancy-based coefficient from Table 3.
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increased overall spending on student services and needs ranging from cafeteria lunches to textbook
purchases. Additionally, the students being retained in school as a result of these NPND policies are
the “marginal dropouts” who are nearly indifferent between dropping out of school and remaining
in school in the absence of the NPND policies. These students likely have an increased preva-
lence of behavioral and learning issues, which may be imposing negative externalities on their peers
(Carrell and Hoekstra 2010), raising the cost of NPND policies by reducing educational quality for
the students who otherwise have their behavior unaffected by these policies. Add to this the fact
that, for nearly a decade, NPND policies increased the likelihood for schools to fail to meet their
Adequate Yearly Progress standards under the No Child Left Behind Act, and Enrollment-based
NPND policies do not appear to be as unambiguously beneficial as previously thought.
Moving forward, policymakers need to reevaluate the goals of No Pass, No Drive policies and ex-
amine how the results of these policies align with their goals. If the goal is simply to keep teenagers
in school, potentially causing improvements in outcomes such as juvenile crime rates (Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez 2016), then Enrollment-based NPND laws appear to successfully achieve this goal
– 9th and 10th grade enrollment increases, without bringing associated decreases in 11th or 12th
grade enrollment. However, if the goal of NPND policies is to improve students’ educational out-
comes, then a revision of these policies is needed. Although Enrollment-based NPND policies in-
crease educational attainment for marginal dropouts, they likely impose substantial costs on their
schools and the overall student population; Truancy-based NPND policies cause teens to drop out
of school, but potentially reduce costs on schools and the overall student population. Enrollment-
based NPND policies increase retention by incentivizing enrollment and attendance, Truancy-based
policies directly decrease enrollment by inducing students to drop out of school, and yet neither
fully achieves its stated goal. In an interview with the New York Times, the West Virginia official
in charge of enforcing the nation’s first NPND policy stated, “We expect our graduation rate to
climb steadily from here on out... Ultimately, that means we’re going to have a better educated
labor force” (Ayres 1989). NPND policies, in their current form, are weakly effective at achieving
these goals.
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Table 1: No Pass, No Drive Policies in the United States
State Name Policy Hardship/Working GED Other
Enactment Year Exemption Exemption
Enrollment-Based
Alabama 1993 Yes No Teen parents exempt
Arkansas 1989 Yes No
Florida 1997 Yes Yes
Georgia 1998 No No
Idaho 1996 No No
Illinois 2007 No No
Indiana 1991 Yes No
Iowa 1994 No24 No
Kentucky 1990, 200725 Yes No
Louisiana 2009 No No
Mississippi 1994 No No
North Carolina 1998 Yes No
Ohio 1992 No Yes
Oklahoma 1996 Yes No
Oregon 2000 No Yes
South Carolina 1998 No No
Tennessee 1990 No No
Texas 1995 No No
West Virginia 1988 No No
Wisconsin 1988 No No Only some counties enacted policy
State Name Policy Truants Discipline Other
Enactment Year Only Only
Truancy-Based
California 1992 Yes No
Delaware 2000 Yes No
Nevada 2003 Yes No
New Mexico 2005 Yes No
Behavior-Based
Kansas 1999 No Yes
Louisiana 200426 No Yes
Oregon 199526 No Yes
Rhode Island 2005 No Yes
Virginia 1996 No No Exempt with parental permission
24In the original version of this policy, Iowa had an exemption for working students. This exemption was removed
in 2005.
25Kentucky instituted this policy in 1990 in some counties; however, the law was struck down by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in 2003 (D.F. v Codell). A new law, identical to the original for the purposes of this research, was
implemented in 2007.
26Louisiana and Oregon initially had Behavior-Based policies focusing on discipline, but then changed to
Enrollment-Based policies focusing on dropouts at a later date.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Deviation Min Max N
Dependent Variables
Dropout Rate 4.42% 1.90% 1.1% 13.7% 869
AFGR 75.69% 8.15% 53.47% 97.72% 1018
% Change 8th-9th 8.79% 6.47% -10.57% 47.10% 1326
% Change 9th-10th -7.24% 6.02% -38.16% 13.84% 1326
% Change 10th-11th -7.96% 5.54% -35.90% 9.00% 1326
% Change 11th-12th -6.16% 5.37% -38.63% 9.97% 1326
12th Grade Grad. Rate 90.44% 6.03% 63.00% 100% (cut off) 1171
5-Year Grad. Rate 77.45% 8.31% 53.92% 100% (cut off) 1018
Control Variables
Unemp. Rate 5.61% 1.88% 2.3% 13.7% 1122
Per-Student Spending $7620.13 $2853.20 $2767 $20910 1071
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Table 3: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Dropouts
Dropout Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enrollment-Based -0.929∗∗ -0.446 0.125 0.272 0.174
(0.351) (0.449) (0.346) (0.375) (0.364)
Other Policies -0.250 0.538 1.018∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.536) (0.295) (0.276)
Truancy-Based 1.229∗∗
(0.263)
Behavior-Based 0.393
(0.648)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes
School and Macro Controls Yes Yes
N 869 869 869 818 818
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
“Fixed Effects” refers to both state and year fixed effects. “School and Macro Controls”
are controls for log(per-student spending) and unemployment rate.
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Table 4: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on AFGR
Averaged Freshman Graduation Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enrollment-Based -3.667∗ -0.127 -1.133 -1.330∗ -1.139
(1.932) (0.685) (0.816) (0.763) (0.764)
Other Policies -4.949∗∗ -2.412 -2.628∗ -2.732∗
(2.244) (1.782) (1.461) (1.448)
Truancy-Based -4.999∗
(2.365)
Behavior-Based 0.597
(1.103)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes
School and Macro Controls Yes Yes
N 1018 1018 1018 1018 1018
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
“Fixed Effects” refers to both state and year fixed effects. “School and Macro Controls”
are controls for log(per-student spending) and unemployment rate.
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Table 5: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Grade Enrollments
Percentage Change in Enrollment
8th-9th 9th-10th 10th-11th 11th-12th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enrollment-Based 2.792∗∗ -1.651 -0.653 0.333
(1.281) (1.040) (0.710) (0.539)
Truancy-Based -0.0158 -0.169 -2.769∗ 0.859
(2.021) (1.927) (1.677) (1.434)
Behavior-Based -0.260 1.673 -1.444 0.955
(0.748) (0.671) (1.119) (0.565)
log(Spending) -14.43∗∗ 3.864 -1.659 -5.341∗
(6.241) (6.248) (5.989) (3.041)
Unemp. Rate -0.575 -0.177 -0.166 -0.0017
(0.352) (0.244) (0.305) (0.196)
N 1071 1071 1071 1071
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
All specifications include state and year fixed effects, controls for
log(per-student spending) and unemployment rate, and state-specific time trends.
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Table 6: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Alternative Graduation Rates
12th Grade 5-Year
Grad. Rate Grad. Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enrollment-Based -0.829 -0.747 -0.738 -0.479
(1.093) (1.086) (0.729) (0.724)
Other Policies -1.230 -3.657
(0.719) (1.827)
Truancy-Based -2.488 -6.422
(1.065) (2.981)
Behavior-Based 0.078 0.0187
(1.167) (0.862)
N 1018 1018 1018 1018
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
All specifications include state and year fixed effects, school and macro controls,
and state-specific time trends.
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(a) Enrollment-Based Policies
(b) Truancy-Based Policies
NOTE: The hashed blocks above show average enrollment and diplomas per 1,000 8th graders for
states without NPND policies. The solid blocks add the estimates from Table 5 to these averages.
Figure 1: No Pass, No Drive Enrollment Effects
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Figure 2: Truancy-Based Policy Trends
(a) Dropout Rate (b) AFGR
(c) % Change 10th-11th
NOTE: Time=0 is the first year of the policy. A vertical line appears at Time=-0.5, so that all points lying to the
left are untreated, and all points lying to the right are treated. Year-by-year point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals are displayed.
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Figure 3: Enrollment-Based Policy Trends
(a) Dropout Rate (b) AFGR
(c) % Change 8th-9th
NOTE: Time=0 is the first year of the policy. A vertical line appears at Time=-0.5, so that all points lying to the
left are untreated, and all points lying to the right are treated. Year-by-year point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals are displayed.
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Figure 4: Policy Effects, Without Linear Trends
(a) Truancy – Dropout Rate (b) Truancy – AFGR
(c) Enrollment – Dropout Rate (d) Enrollment – AFGR
NOTE: Time=0 is the first year of the policy. A vertical line appears at Time=-0.5, so that all points lying to the
left are untreated, and all points lying to the right are treated. Year-by-year point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals are displayed.
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Appendix: Placebo Testing and Bootstrapping
A possible concern with my results is that the data may be structured in a way that causes a high
rate of type I error. For example, data with an extremely high level of variation in the dependent
variables could cause overrejection of the null hypothesis, and thus any regression results would be
largely uninterpretable. Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that difference-in-difference estimation
often suffers from overrejection of the null hypothesis, caused by serial correlation in the dependent
variable. Since my dependent variable certainly has serial correlation, this could be causing my
standard errors to be too small, creating type I error. To examine this problem, I mimic the
methodology of Bertrand et al., by creating a group of “placebo policies,” where the policies are
randomly assigned to various states, but in a similar way to how they are actually distributed across
the United States. For Enrollment-Based policies, each state is given a 40% chance to begin the
placebo policy so that in expectation, the number of states with the policy will be 20, the same as
the number of Enrollment-Based states. In testing Truancy-Based policies, states are given an 8%
chance to begin the placebo policy. After these states are selected, a “policy enactment year” is
randomly selected from the discrete uniform distribution, with the earliest possible start year being
1987. Then, regression models identical to my main specifications are run and the placebo policy
treatment coefficient is tested at the same significance level of my actual result to see the degree to
which my results are at risk of type 1 error. In addition, I test for symmetry by performing both 1-
and 2-tailed significance tests. If the data are structured in a way that causes overrejection of the
null hypothesis in only one direction, this could also be cause for concern. For regression models
where I did not find significance, I test for type II error by running these models and testing the
placebo policy treatment coefficient at the p<0.1 level. I simulate these placebo policy assignments
for 10,000 replications, and calculate the simulated rejection rate I observe. The results of these
placebo tests are summarized in Table A1.
The Enrollment-Based placebo testing yielded no unexpected results – in all regression models,
the rejection probability was extremely close to its expected level. However, the Truancy-Based
placebo testing demonstrated severe type I error – testing dropout rates at the 1% significance level,
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the null hypothesis was rejected over 20% of the time. All other measures also showed high rates of
rejection for Truancy-Based policies. This indicates that using OLS standard errors is inappropriate
for this analysis. The Enrollment-Based policy results, however, do not seem to face this problem,
and are therefore unlikely to be driven by pure chance.
To correct for the type I error demonstrated by my placebo testing, I follow the methodology
of Cameron et al. (2008) and use the wild restricted cluster bootstrap t-statistic for statistical
inference on Truancy-based policies. In their analysis, Cameron et al. test the setup of Bertrand
et al. (2004), and show that by using the wild cluster bootstrap-t, they can achieve rejection rates
with little to no Type I error. In performing this test, the standard cluster-robust variance estimate
is used to calculate the standard errors, but the Wald statistic generated from this estimate is tested
against the bootstrap distribution of Wald statistics. Table A2 shows the Wald statistic for each
regression, and the p-value from testing this against the bootstrap Wald distribution (B=10,000).
All Truancy-based policies in the main body of the paper reflect these bootstrapped p-values.
From these results, three of the seven main regressions in my analysis show statistical significance
for at least p < 0.1, and two, the 5-Year Graduation Rate and the 12th Grade Graduation Rate,
are statistically significant in the typical OLS Wald test but are not significant when performing
wild cluster bootstrap-t testing.
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Table A1: Placebo Policy Testing Results
Significance Level (Tails) Rejection Percentage
Enrollment-Based – 40% Chance to Begin Placebo Policy
Dropout Rate 0.1 (2) 11.19%
AFGR 0.1 (2) 11.27%
AFGR 0.05 (1) 5.68%
12th Grade Grad. Rate 0.1 (2) 10.90%
5-Year Grad. Rate 0.1 (2) 10.85%
Percentage Changes
8th-9th 0.05 (2) 4.94%
8th-9th 0.025 (1) 2.63%
9th-10th 0.1 (2) 10.35%
10th-11th 0.1 (2) 10.38%
11th-12th 0.1 (2) 10.78%
Truancy-Based – 8% Chance to Begin Placebo Policy
Dropout Rate 0.01 (2) 21.05%
Dropout Rate 0.005 (1) 8.93%
AFGR 0.05 (2) 26.21%
AFGR 0.025 (1) 12.05%
12th Grade Grad. Rate 0.05 (2) 24.18%
12th Grade Grad. Rate 0.025 (1) 11.47%
5-Year Grad. Rate 0.1 (2) 25.44%
5-Year Grad. Rate 0.05 (1) 11.61%
Percentage Changes
8th-9th 0.1 (2) 30.13%
9th-10th 0.1 (2) 31.90%
10th-11th 0.1 (2) 25.45%
11th-12th 0.1 (2) 30.39%
NOTE: All rejection percentages are for 10,000 replications.
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Table A2: Bootstrapping Results
Dependent Variable t-statistic p-value
Dropout Rate 5.90 0.011
AFGR -2.36 0.071
% Change 9th-10th 0.60 0.603
% Change 10th-11th -1.90 0.074
% Change 11th-12th -0.56 0.627
5-Year Grad. Rate -2.15 0.307
12th Grade Grad. Rate 2.43 0.522
All specifications test Truancy-Based policies.
NOTE: All Behavior-Based policies were not significant
at the p < 0.1 level, and are omitted from this table.
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Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A3: Teen Driving Status by Grade
9th Grade 10th Grade 11th Grade
Drive on Their Own 10% 33% 67%
Learning to Drive 44% 50% 23%
Affected by NPND 54% 83% 90%
Do not Drive 46% 17% 10%
SOURCE: Driving Through the Eyes of Teens, A Closer Look. 2009.
46
Table A4: No Pass, No Drive Enrforcement, 2009-10 School Year
State Type of Enforcement Number Total Teen Drivers
(Under Age 18 in 2009)
Florida – 3rd Quarter ONLY 343,250
Notices of Ineligibility for License Issued 7,557
Notices of Intent to Suspend License Issued 2,219
Suspensions Issued 1,844
Second Suspensions Issued to Repeat Violators 100
Georgia Suspensions Issued 16,000 91,179
Kentucky Suspensions Issued 2,317 20,220
Tennessee Suspensions Issued 3,697 132,210
SOURCE: Columns 2-3 Strengthening Attend ‘n’ Drive Laws to Reduce Truancy and Dropouts (2011).
Column 4 US Federal Highway Administration (2009).
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Table A5: Donut Treatment Effects on Event Dropout Rates
Dropout Rate
Excluding 1st Year
Excluding 1st Year and California
Enrollment-Based 0.120 0.123
(0.398) (0.398)
Truancy-Based 1.979∗∗ 1.990∗∗
(0.544) (0.543)
Behavior-Based 0.639 0.640
(0.227) (0.227)
N 816 806
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
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Table A6: Effects on AFGR and Enrollment,
Excluding Louisiana and Oregon
(1) (2)
8th-9th
AFGR Enrollment Change
Enrollment-Based -1.081 2.465∗
(0.807) (1.247)
Truancy-Based -4.464∗ -2.206
(3.354) (1.362)
Behavior-Based 0.622 -0.296
(1.143) (0.804)
N 978 1029
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
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Table A7: Replication of Barua and Vidal-Fernandez
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All States Omit CA Omit DE Omit NV Omit NM
Panel A: BVF Data – High School Completion
Enrollment 0.00947∗ 0.0120∗∗ 0.00955∗ 0.00962∗ 0.00958∗
(0.00564) (0.00541) (0.00565) (0.00566) (0.00564)
Truancy 0.0336∗∗∗ -0.0272 0.0342∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗
(0.00484) (0.0181) (0.00527) (0.00514) (0.00493)
Behavior -0.00547∗ -0.00201 -0.00557∗ -0.00534 -0.00546∗
(0.00324) (0.00260) (0.00329) (0.00331) (0.00324)
N 1821191 1636657 1817644 1817509 1811864
Panel B: NCES Data – Dropout Rate
Enrollment 0.174 0.178 0.160 0.182 0.150
(0.364) (0.364) (0.378) (0.365) (0.371)
Truancy 1.229∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.263) (0.111) (0.324) (0.355)
Behavior 0.393 0.389 0.366 0.342 0.355
(0.648) (0.652) (0.628) (0.656) (0.664)
N 818 808 799 799 798
Panel C: NCES Data – AFGR
Enrollment -1.139 -1.108 -1.151 -1.051 -1.207
(0.764) (0.775) (0.769) (0.742) (0.772)
Truancy -4.999∗ -5.969∗∗ -5.545∗ -2.843∗ -6.194∗∗
(2.365) (2.466) (2.770) (1.695) (2.570)
Behavior 0.597 0.615 0.586 0.563 0.561
(1.103) (1.158) (1.109) (1.141) (1.122)
N 1018 998 998 998 998
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state of birth (Panel A)
or state of residence (Panels B, C)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(a) No Controls (b) Residual of Controls
Delaware
(c) No Controls (d) Residual of Controls
New Mexico
(e) No Controls (f) Residual of Controls
Nevada
Figure A1: Pre- and Post-Policy Dropout Rate Trends for Truancy-based States
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